

Project Dissertation Report on

IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL DISRUPTIONS ON B2C EXPORT

LOGISTICS:

A STUDY OF INDIA POST INTERNATIONAL SERVICES

(FEBRUARY - MARCH 2026)

Submitted By

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Major Research Project titled "Impact of Geopolitical Disruptions on B2C Export Logistics: A Study of India Post International Services (February - March 2026)" has been successfully completed by Rohan, Roll No. 24/DMBA/197, under my guidance and supervision. This project has been submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration (MBA) at Delhi School of Management, Delhi Technological University, for the Academic Year 2025-2026.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, this report is an original and independent piece of work. It has not been copied from any other source without proper acknowledgement and has not been submitted for any other academic award at this or any other institution.

The student has worked sincerely throughout and has maintained the required academic standards. I am satisfied with the quality of this work and recommend it for evaluation.

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DECLARATION

I, Rohan, Roll No. 24/DMBA/197, student of Master of Business Administration (MBA) at Delhi School of Management, Delhi Technological University, hereby declare that the Major Research Project titled "Impact of Geopolitical Disruptions on B2C Export Logistics: A Study of India Post International Services (February - March 2026)" is an original piece of work done by me under the supervision of Dr. Deep Shree, Delhi School of Management, DTU.

I further declare that this project has not been submitted earlier for any degree, diploma, or other qualification at any university or institution. The data used in this study was collected from operational dashboards during my internship at a B2C export logistics platform. All analysis and findings presented here are based on real operational data.

I am fully aware that plagiarism or fabrication of data is a serious academic offence. I confirm that the plagiarism level in this report is within the permissible limit as per the guidelines of Delhi School of Management, DTU.

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This project would not have been possible without the support of a few key people, and I want to take this space to thank them.

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Finally, thank you to my family and friends for always being there.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This project looks at how India Post's two international B2C shipping services, ITPS (India Tracked Packet Service) and EMS (Express Mail Service), performed during a period of global disruption caused by the Iran war that started on February 28, 2026.

The study was done during an internship at a B2C export logistics platform that gives Indian SME exporters access to multiple shipping options, including India Post. Using data from the company's internal Metabase dashboard, this report tracks what happened to shipments, revenue, customer numbers, destination countries, and delivery times across January, February, and March 2026.

The main finding is simple: when the Iran war broke out on February 28, 2026, private logistics companies started charging war risk surcharges on routes to the USA and UK. India Post did not charge any surcharge. This price difference caused a big shift in customer behaviour in March. Shipments went up by 134%, revenue jumped by 143%, and the USA went from being a small destination in February to becoming the number one destination in March.

The platform did not wait for customers to find this out on their own. The team changed how it spoke to customers about India Post. Before the war, India Post was just one of the available options on the platform. After the war started, the team repositioned it as the smart cost-saving choice with good delivery times. Targeted messages went out to existing and potential customers. The response was very strong.

The study also looks at weight patterns, processing nodes, weekly trends, and customer groups to show a full picture of how the business changed across these three months.

The key learning is practical: when a global event raises shipping costs across private carriers, a government postal service like India Post that does not add surcharges suddenly becomes much more attractive. Platforms and exporters who spot this early and act fast are the ones who benefit the most.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

India's small and medium exporters have always had one major problem: the cost of shipping goods abroad. Whether it is jewellery going to Canada, handloom fabric going to Germany, or accessories going to the USA, the shipping cost can eat into margins very quickly. For a small exporter sending packages worth a few thousand rupees each, paying a high courier charge does not work. This is exactly the gap that India Post's international services try to fill.

India Post has been doing international shipping for many years, but it only started getting real attention from e-commerce exporters recently. The launch of ITPS and the continued operation of EMS gave small exporters a government-backed, affordable option to reach customers in over 135 countries. For a long time, the perception was that India Post was slow and unreliable. That has been slowly changing.

This study was done during an internship at a B2C export logistics platform that puts multiple shipping options for Indian SME exporters on one platform. One of those options is India Post, both ITPS and EMS. The company uses an internal analytics dashboard on Metabase, built using SQL queries on operational data. During the internship, the intern was involved in building and tracking these dashboards.

In January 2026, the India Post service on this platform had just started. There were barely 15 to 20 customers using it, and revenue was below one lakh rupees. By February, this had grown to 132 customers, 1,216 shipments, and revenue of about 9.88 lakh rupees. Then in March 2026, shipments went up by 134% and revenue crossed 24 lakhs. Something changed sharply between February and March, and that was the Iran war.

The Iran war started on February 28, 2026. From March 1, private logistics companies started adding war risk surcharges, especially on routes to the USA and UK. India Post, being a government service, did not add any surcharge. This one difference created a clear opening for India Post, and the platform acted on it fast.

1.2 India Post International Services: ITPS and EMS

ITPS stands for India Tracked Packet Service. It is designed for exporters sending smaller, lighter packages, mainly under two kilograms. It covers over 135 countries and is much cheaper than private courier options for packages in this weight range. The tracking is end-to-end, which is important for exporters who need proof of delivery. For the kind of exporters on this platform, mostly selling jewellery, garments, handicrafts, and small accessories, ITPS is a natural fit.

EMS, or Express Mail Service, is India Post's faster and heavier option. It handles packages up to 20 kg and connects to fewer countries compared to ITPS. Delivery times are generally faster, and the pricing, while higher than ITPS, is still competitive against private express couriers for mid-weight packages.

Both services go through specific processing nodes across India. JPRPC1 in Jaipur handled the majority of shipments during the period studied. This is mainly because a large part of the exporter base on this platform is from Jaipur, which is a major hub for gems, jewellery, and textile exports.

1.3 The Iran War and Its Impact on Shipping

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a major coordinated military operation targeting Iran's nuclear and military infrastructure. The operation was called Operation Epic Fury. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks in the region. One of the first consequences for global trade was the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's daily oil supply passes, being blocked to Western commercial shipping by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The global shipping industry reacted very quickly. Major carriers like Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk paused or rerouted sailings and introduced war risk surcharges. Hapag-Lloyd applied a surcharge of USD 1,500 per standard container for bookings from March 2, 2026. Air cargo carriers also put restrictions and extra charges on routes connected to the Middle East. Private express courier companies added surcharges on USA and UK routes because those routes were operationally affected by the conflict (Supply Chain Dive, 2026; Automotive Logistics Media, 2026).

India Post, being a government service, does not change its pricing based on short-term market events. Its rates stayed the same. This was not a planned business strategy. It is simply how government postal services work. But the practical result was important: on routes where private carriers were now charging more, India Post had become the more affordable option.

1.4 Problem Statement

The India Post service on this platform was growing steadily before the war. The sharp jump in March was clearly linked to the war surcharges in the market. The key question this study tries to answer is: what exactly changed in the India Post B2C export data between February and March 2026, and how much of that change was because of the geopolitical event and the platform's response to it?

This matters because similar events have happened before, like the Red Sea crisis in 2023-24, and they will happen again. Understanding how to read these signals and respond quickly has real business value.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

The study aims to:

- Track and compare shipment, customer, and revenue data across January, February, and March 2026 to understand the growth pattern.

- Understand how the Iran war and the resulting war surcharges by private carriers changed India Post's position in the market.
- Identify which destination countries and service types, ITPS vs EMS, saw the biggest changes between February and March.
- Understand the role of the platform's strategic repositioning and customer communication in driving the March growth.
- Offer practical recommendations for logistics platforms and SME exporters on handling geopolitical disruptions.

1.6 Scope of Study

This study covers January to March 2026 and focuses on India Post's ITPS and EMS services as used through one B2C export logistics platform. The data comes from an internal Metabase dashboard built on the company's operational database. The study does not cover other logistics providers on the platform, and it only looks at B2C cross-border exports from India to international destinations.

The analysis is quantitative, looking at actual numbers and trends from the dashboard. No primary survey data was collected. All findings are based on operational data.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This study is useful at three levels. For logistics platforms, it shows how quickly a competitive window can open during a global event, and how important it is to communicate that advantage to customers fast. The platform's quick response in March is a real example worth documenting.

For SME exporters, the data shows that India Post is a competitive, serious option, not just a last resort. Good pricing and solid delivery times exist all year, not just during crises. Knowing this helps exporters make smarter logistics decisions.

For academics and researchers, this is a real-world, data-backed case study of how geopolitical events change B2C export logistics in India. There are very few India-specific studies on this segment, and this adds a useful and detailed case to that space.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 B2C Cross-Border Exports from India

India's B2C export market through e-commerce has been growing fast over the past several years. A large crafts and manufacturing base, a growing number of small exporters going digital, and increasing global demand for Indian products have all helped this growth. NASSCOM (2024) estimated that India's B2C export market was growing at over 25% per year, with SMEs making up a large and growing share of this volume.

The products being exported are fairly specific. Jewellery, gemstones, apparel, textiles, handicrafts, and wellness products make up the bulk of Indian B2C exports. Most of these are lightweight, which is exactly what ITPS was designed for. The challenge for small exporters has always been finding shipping options that do not eat too much into their margins.

Goswami and Mathur (2020) noted that logistics cost is consistently one of the top three problems cited by Indian SMEs trying to export. Being able to ship affordably and reliably to destinations like Canada, the USA, Germany, and the UK, where Indian diaspora communities create a natural demand base, often determines whether an export business works or not.

2.2 India Post as a Logistics Provider

India Post has historically been seen as a service for letters, money orders, and local parcels, not a serious option for international export logistics. That view started changing when ITPS was introduced and EMS was strengthened with better tracking and processing.

The International Labour Organization (2024), in its review of global postal logistics, noted that in developing economies, national postal services often play an important

role in helping SME exports, especially for goods under two kilograms. India Post fits this well. It has the network, the country reach, and the pricing that small exporters need.

The biggest challenge India Post has faced is a perception problem. Many exporters still think it is slower or less reliable than private couriers. Research by IIFT (2023) found that SME exporters who had actually used India Post's international services were generally more satisfied than those who had never used it but had strong negative views about it. The reputation gap was bigger than the actual performance gap.

In this study, the TAT data from the dashboard helps address exactly this. The data shows that for most destinations, India Post's average delivery times were competitive. This is one reason the platform was confident enough to change its communication message about India Post.

2.3 Geopolitical Risk in Supply Chains

The link between geopolitical events and supply chain disruptions is well documented. Sheffi (2015) argued that unlike natural disasters, geopolitical shocks often follow patterns. They tend to affect specific trade routes, specific cargo types, or specific countries. This means companies that are paying attention can sometimes position themselves before the full market impact hits.

The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic was the biggest recent example of a global supply chain shock. But there were others too. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in late 2023 pushed major carriers to reroute through the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to transit times and billions in costs to global trade. The Iran war of 2026 created a similar, arguably more immediate disruption, affecting both the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea routes at the same time.

Christopher and Peck (2004) argued that supply chain vulnerability depends on two things: how intense the disruption is and how fast recovery happens. The Iran war showed that disruption was immediate, with surcharges appearing within 24-48 hours of the strikes. Recovery, however, was slow, as the ceasefire only came in April 2026. This meant a full month of higher pricing for anyone using private carriers on affected routes.

2.4 War Surcharges and Their Impact

War risk surcharges are not new. Shipping companies have applied them on Middle East routes at different points since the 1980s. They exist because the risk of cargo loss or vessel damage is genuinely higher in an active conflict zone, and insurance costs go up. In 2026, the speed and scale of surcharge application was notable.

Hapag-Lloyd introduced a USD 1,500 per container surcharge within 24 hours of the February 28 strikes. Maersk paused future sailings on affected routes almost immediately. Air cargo carriers put restrictions on routes involving Middle Eastern airports. For express parcel carriers serving e-commerce, surcharges appeared on USA and UK routes, as those were operationally linked to the conflict's impact (Supply Chain Dive, 2026; The Register, 2026).

For Indian B2C exporters, the impact was felt most on USA and UK routes. These are two of the biggest markets for Indian exporters. A per-shipment surcharge hits hard when package values are in the range of one to three thousand rupees.

India Post operates on a different model. Its pricing is set by policy, not by market conditions. It does not respond to short-term risk events with surcharges the way private carriers do. This structural difference is what created the price advantage in March 2026.

2.5 Strategic Repositioning During Market Disruptions

Kotler and Keller (2016) argued that during a market disruption, the brands and companies that communicate their value proposition clearly and quickly tend to gain customers who stay loyal even after the disruption ends. Customer acquisition cost is lower during a crisis because customers are already looking for alternatives and are motivated to switch.

In the B2C logistics platform context, this is especially relevant. When a shipper's usual carrier adds a surcharge, they look for options. If a platform can quickly and clearly show that it has a no-surcharge option, the conversion rate is much higher than normal. The speed of communication is as important as the offer itself.

The platform in this study changed its messaging to highlight India Post as the cost-saving option specifically because of the surcharge situation. This is a straightforward example of reactive positioning: spotting a competitor weakness and turning it into a communication opportunity. The results in Chapter 4 show how well it worked.

2.6 Research Gaps

Looking at existing research, a few gaps are clear. Most quantitative studies on logistics disruptions focus on ocean freight or air cargo at a macro level. Very little work looks at how B2C postal logistics for Indian SME exporters responds to geopolitical events. The specific combination of India Post services, Indian SME exporters, and the 2026 Iran war has not been studied before.

Most existing studies also look at disruptions after they have ended, using historical data. This study captures data from during the disruption, giving a more immediate and real-time picture of how the market shifted.

This research fills these gaps by using actual operational data from a platform that is right at the intersection of SME exports, postal logistics, and crisis response.

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains how this study was done: the research design, where the data came from, what variables were tracked, and what the limitations are.

3.1 Research Design

This study uses a descriptive research design. The goal was to describe, using actual operational data, what happened to India Post B2C export shipments during a specific period of global disruption. There was no experiment or intervention. The aim was to look at what the numbers showed and understand what drove the changes.

The approach is a time-series comparison. Data from January 2026 (baseline), February 2026 (pre-war), and March 2026 (war and post-surcharge period) was compared across multiple dimensions: volume, revenue, destinations, weight, and delivery times. This before-and-after comparison is a standard method in operations analysis.

3.2 Data Source

All data used in this study came from an internal analytics dashboard that the intern helped build and maintain during the internship. The dashboard was created on Metabase, a business intelligence tool, using SQL queries on the company's operational database. The data represents actual bookings and shipments made by customers through the platform.

This is operational data, not survey data and not secondary data from a published source. It is the company's own transactional records. This makes it very accurate for the specific questions this study is trying to answer. However, findings are limited to this one platform and cannot automatically be applied to all India Post B2C export volumes.

3.3 Variables Tracked

The following variables were tracked from the Metabase dashboard for the study period:

Table 3.1: Variables Tracked in the Analysis

Variable	Description	Source
Unique customers	Distinct customer IDs active in the period	Dashboard
Total shipments	All confirmed and dispatched bookings	Dashboard
Total revenue (Rs.)	Total shipment value routed through the platform	Dashboard
Country-wise revenue	Revenue split by destination country	Dashboard
Service-wise revenue	Split between ITPS and EMS services	Dashboard
TAT (delivery time)	Min, max, average, P80 delivery days by country	Dashboard
Weight slab distribution	Volume share by package weight category	Dashboard
Node-wise distribution	Volume share by processing hub	Dashboard

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

3.4 Period of Study

The study covers three months: January 2026, February 2026, and March 2026.

January 2026 is the baseline. The India Post service had just been launched on the platform this month, with only 15-20 customers and revenue below one lakh rupees. This is the starting reference point.

February 2026 is the pre-war period. The Iran war started on the very last day of this month, February 28, 2026. So the entire February data shows the service before any war-related disruption affected the market.

March 2026 is the war period. From March 1, private carrier surcharges were in place. The data for this month captures the full impact of the competitive shift towards India Post, along with the effect of the platform's proactive customer communication.

3.5 Limitations of Methodology

There are some honest limitations to this study worth noting.

First, the data is from only one platform. India Post processes shipments through many partners and channels. The numbers here represent only the volumes handled by this specific platform and may not show the full picture of India Post's B2C export growth in this period.

Second, the study cannot directly prove why individual customers chose India Post in March. The reason, war surcharges by competitors, is inferred from market context. The link is strong and the timing is clear, but it is not direct proof in the strict scientific sense.

Third, January data is approximate. Since the service had just launched, dashboard records for January are less complete. The numbers cited for January are estimates based on available records.

CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Overview: Three Months of Data

The simplest way to understand what happened is to look at all three months side by side. The table below shows the full picture.

Table 4.1: Month-Wise Summary (January - March 2026)

Metric	January 2026	February 2026	March 2026
Unique Customers	15-20	132	181
Total Shipments	30-40 (est.)	1,216	2,848
Total Revenue (Rs.)	< 1,00,000	9,88,469	24,01,471
ITPS Revenue (Rs.)	Not tracked	7,12,301	19,78,935
EMS Revenue (Rs.)	Not tracked	2,76,168	4,22,534
ITPS Shipments	Not tracked	1,131	2,730
EMS Shipments	Not tracked	85	118

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The January numbers are small because the service had just been added to the platform. Growth through February was strong and healthy. Then the jump from February to March is very large. Shipments went up 134%, total revenue went up 143%, and the customer base grew by 37%. This kind of growth in a single month does not happen on its own.

The Iran war started on February 28. Private carrier surcharges came in from March 1-2. India Post had no surcharge. The platform changed its communication message. The market responded.

4.2 February Analysis: The Baseline

4.2.1 Revenue, Shipments and Customers

In February 2026, the platform had 132 unique customers sending 1,216 shipments through India Post, generating total revenue of Rs. 9,88,469. ITPS was the main service, with Rs. 7,12,301 or about 72% of total revenue. EMS contributed Rs. 2,76,168. On the ITPS side, 1,131 shipments were processed. EMS handled 85 shipments.

The customer base had one clear top account. Dinesh Exports alone sent 165 shipments worth Rs. 1,46,211, the highest of any single customer. The top five customers together drove a very large share of the month's total business. This is normal for a service in its early growth phase where a small number of regular, high-volume customers do the bulk of the volume.

Table 4.2: Top Customers by Revenue - February 2026

Customer Name	Shipments	Revenue (Rs.)
Dinesh Exports	165	1,46,211
Safari Gems	99	69,570
Rajhans Export	63	60,021
Aaditya Enterprises	98	41,269
Manisha Export	26	27,635
Mam Treasures	48	26,262
Samriddhi Enterprises	35	22,451
ST. Johns Exim	7	21,221

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The daily trend chart below shows how February played out day by day. Shipments started at around 20 per day in early February and built up to 60-80 per day by the end of the month. Revenue tracked upward alongside. The pattern shows steady organic growth as more exporters tried the service.




Figure 4.1: Daily Revenue and Shipments Trend - February 2026

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.2.2 Country-Wise Distribution - February

The destination country breakdown for February is an important baseline. Canada was the top destination at 24.68% of ITPS revenue and 27.67% of overall revenue. Germany was second. France, Australia, and Switzerland followed. The USA was present but not prominent at only 3.82% of ITPS revenue and 2.57% of overall revenue.

This shows that before the war, India Post on this platform was mainly being used to send to Canada, Europe, and Australia. The USA was a small part of the mix. This makes the March shift even more striking.

Table 4.3: Top Destination Countries - February 2026

Country	ITPS Revenue Share (%)	Overall Revenue Share (%)
Canada	24.68	27.67
Germany	14.69	12.37
France	8.96	7.51
Australia	7.55	5.45
Switzerland	5.17	5.04
Japan	2.55	4.99

Country	ITPS Revenue Share (%)	Overall Revenue Share (%)
Italy	4.04	4.39
USA	3.82	2.57

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The chart below shows the country-wise revenue split for both ITPS and EMS in February:




Figure 4.2: Country-Wise Revenue Split - February 2026 (ITPS and EMS)

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.2.3 Weight Distribution - February

Looking at the weight slab breakdown for ITPS in February, over 51% of all shipments were in the 0-250 gram range. Another 21.31% were in the 250-500 gram range. Together, more than 72% of shipments were below 500 grams. This makes complete sense given the products being exported, mostly small, light goods like jewellery, accessories, and small textile pieces.

Table 4.4: ITPS Weight Slab Distribution - February 2026

Weight Slab	% of Shipments
0-250 g	51.02%
250g-500g	21.31%
500g-750g	12.64%

Weight Slab	% of Shipments
750g-1 kg	5.92%
1 kg-1.5 kg	4.60%
1.5 kg-2 kg	4.51%

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026; ITPS Total Shipments: 1,131




Figure 4.3: ITPS Weight Slab Distribution - February 2026

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.2.4 TAT (Delivery Time) - February

The TAT analysis below shows delivery time performance across destination countries for ITPS in February. For most European destinations, average delivery time was in the range of 10 to 25 days. Some countries like Bulgaria and Latvia showed higher maximum TAT values, pointing to occasional longer deliveries. The P80 metric, the time within which 80% of shipments were delivered, was more stable with most countries coming in under 30 days.




Figure 4.4: TAT Analysis by Country - February 2026 (ITPS)

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

Overall, the February TAT data shows a service performing reasonably well, with some variability by destination, which is normal in postal logistics.

4.2.5 Node-Wise Distribution - February

JPRPC1, the Jaipur processing node, handled 77.46% of all shipments in February. This reflects that a large portion of the customer base at this stage was from the Jaipur region. Delhi (DELPC1) handled 5.69% and Surat (SURPC1) handled 2.77%. The heavy Jaipur concentration was expected given where the platform's customers were located at that point.

4.3 March Analysis: The War Impact

4.3.1 Revenue, Shipments and Customers

March 2026 was a completely different story. The platform had 181 unique customers, up from 132 in February. Total shipments reached 2,848, a jump of 134%. Total revenue hit Rs. 24,01,471, up 143%. ITPS contributed Rs. 19,78,935 and EMS contributed Rs. 4,22,534.

The ITPS shipment count went from 1,131 to 2,730, an increase of 141%. EMS went from 85 to 118, a more moderate but still solid increase of 39%. ITPS grew much faster than EMS, which makes sense. ITPS is the more price-sensitive service. When price becomes the deciding factor, the cheaper option benefits the most.

Table 4.5: Month-on-Month Growth - February to March 2026

Metric	February 2026	March 2026	Growth (%)
Unique Customers	132	181	+37.1%
Total Shipments	1,216	2,848	+134.2%
Total Revenue (Rs.)	9,88,469	24,01,471	+142.9%
ITPS Revenue (Rs.)	7,12,301	19,78,935	+177.8%
EMS Revenue (Rs.)	2,76,168	4,22,534	+53.0%
ITPS Shipments	1,131	2,730	+141.5%
EMS Shipments	85	118	+38.8%

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The daily trend for March looked very different from February. Shipments were consistently in the 60-180 range per day compared to 20-80 in February. Revenue also moved sharply higher, with several days crossing Rs. 1,00,000 in daily revenue.



Figure 4.5: Daily Revenue and Shipments Trend - March 2026

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.3.2 Country-Wise Distribution - March

The country-wise breakdown for March is where the clearest signal of the war's impact appears. The USA, which was at 3.82% of ITPS revenue in February, jumped to 24.00% in March, making it the single largest destination. Canada stayed strong at 20.47%. The UK also rose to 7.60%.

This shift is directly connected to the war surcharges. The USA and UK were the routes where private carriers applied the most significant surcharges. India Post charged nothing extra. Indian exporters who shipped regularly to US customers had a clear reason to switch to India Post and they did.

Table 4.6: Top Destination Countries - March 2026

Country	ITPS Revenue Share (%)	Overall Revenue Share (%)
USA	24.00	20.89
Canada	20.47	20.21
Germany	9.98	9.56
UK	7.60	6.54
France	7.06	6.90
Australia	5.33	4.77
Switzerland	3.67	4.23

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026




Figure 4.6: Country-Wise Revenue Split - March 2026 (ITPS and EMS)

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The table below summarises the war surcharge situation that created this shift:

Table 4.7: War Surcharge Status - Logistics Options - March 2026

Logistics Type	War Surcharge Applied?	Impact on India-USA Route
Major private ocean carriers (Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk etc.)	Yes - USD 1,500+ per container	Large cost increase
Private express courier aggregators	Yes - applied on USA/UK routes	Higher per-shipment cost
India Post (ITPS / EMS)	No - pricing unchanged	No extra cost to exporter

Source: Supply Chain Dive (2026); Automotive Logistics Media (2026); Company Dashboard, 2026

4.3.3 Weight Distribution - March

The weight profile in March shifted compared to February. The 0-250g share fell from 51.02% to 38.64%. Heavier categories grew. The 250g-500g slab rose to 24.07%, the 500g-750g went up to 13.88%, and heavier slabs also increased.

Table 4.8: ITPS Weight Slab Comparison - February vs March 2026

Weight Slab	February 2026 (%)	March 2026 (%)
0-250 g	51.02	38.64
250g-500g	21.31	24.07
500g-750g	12.64	13.88
750g-1 kg	5.92	9.74
1 kg-1.5 kg	4.60	6.26
1.5 kg-2 kg	4.51	7.40

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026




Figure 4.7: ITPS Weight Slab Distribution - March 2026

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

This shift in weight distribution suggests that new customers coming in during March were not only sending the smallest packages. They were bringing their regular shipping habits with them, which included slightly heavier packages. This also points to the fact that these were real, active exporters switching over from private carriers, not just people trying the service with tiny test shipments.

4.3.4 Node-Wise Distribution - March

In March, Jaipur's share dropped from 77.46% in February to 69.66%. Delhi (DELPC1) rose to 8.81% and Surat (SURPC1) rose to 8.41%. This reflects the broader geographic spread of new customers. Exporters from Delhi and Surat who switched from private carriers brought their shipments to their local processing nodes.

Table 4.9: Node-Wise Revenue Distribution - February vs March 2026

Processing Node	February 2026 (%)	March 2026 (%)
JPRPC1 (Jaipur)	77.46	69.66
DELPC1 (Delhi)	5.69	8.81
SURPC1 (Surat)	2.77	8.41
PPNZIPYPOST_3_1	6.20	5.18
RRKPC1	4.26	4.23
Other	0.89	3.71

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.3.5 TAT (Delivery Time) - March

The TAT data for March shows generally strong delivery performance across destination countries. For most countries on both ITPS and EMS, average and P80 delivery times were competitive and in line with or better than February. This confirms that India Post's delivery performance held up well during the war period and backed up the platform's confidence in positioning it as a reliable option.




Figure 4.8: TAT Analysis by Country - March 2026 (ITPS)

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

The TAT data also helped explain something important. Before the war, India Post already had good average delivery times for most routes. The performance was there, but the messaging had not highlighted it. The war surcharges gave the team a reason to push this advantage to customers, and the TAT data backed it up. A product can have real strengths that are being underused simply because the communication around it does not highlight those strengths.

4.4 Weekly Trend Analysis

The weekly trend charts for both months give a cleaner view of how the growth played out over time, without the ups and downs of day-to-day numbers.

In February, the weekly data showed steady but gradual growth. Active customers started at around 30 per week and grew to about 100 by the last week of the month. Weekly revenue built from roughly Rs. 1.5 lakh to about Rs. 3.5 lakh. This was healthy growth for a service that was still fairly new on the platform.

In March, the pattern was very different. The first week of March already showed a sharp jump compared to where February had ended. By the second week around March 9, weekly revenue had crossed Rs. 6 lakh. The third week, around March 16 to 22, was the peak. Revenue touched nearly Rs. 7 lakh for the week and shipments were at their highest. In the last week of March, there was a drop. This may reflect customers completing their month's shipping or some node-level capacity adjustments. But even the last week of March was still much higher than any week in February.

The timing of the peak matters. It was not in week one of March. It took about two to three weeks for the full effect to show up. The war started on February 28, surcharges came in over the first few days of March, the platform sent out its communication, and customers made their decisions and started shipping over the next two weeks. Market shifts like this do not happen overnight. There is usually a two to three week lag between the trigger and the peak response.




Figure 4.9: Weekly Trend - Shipments and Revenue - March 2026

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026

4.5 Customer Segmentation

The customer segregation data from both months shows a consistent pattern across three groups: Top 10% (high-volume customers), Mid-tier, and Long-tail (occasional shippers).

In February, the Top 10% customers, about 13 accounts, drove a large share of total revenue and shipments. Their average shipments per customer were high and their revenue contribution per customer was strong. The long-tail was large in count but small in contribution per customer.

In March, the total customer count went from 132 to 181, a net addition of 49 customers. Most of this growth came in the long-tail and mid-tier segments. This suggests that many new customers were trying India Post for the first time, switching from private carriers because of the surcharges. They started with smaller or trial bookings. The top-tier customers, the existing high-volume ones, also shipped more, but the growth was bigger among the newer, smaller tiers.

This is an important observation. A lot of March growth was trial-based. New customers came in because India Post suddenly looked more attractive due to the price difference. Whether they stayed after surcharges were reduced would depend on how good their experience with India Post was in March. Retaining these new customers was the next challenge for the platform.

4.6 The Pivot: Strategic Repositioning

The growth in March was not just a passive result of the market situation. The platform made an active decision to change how it talked to customers about India Post, and this decision was a key part of why the growth was as strong as it was.

Before the war, India Post was positioned on the platform as a partner, one of several available shipping options, listed alongside others. It was described in terms of its features: price, country coverage, tracking availability. This is a product-focused message. It works for customers who are already comparing options.

After the war, the message changed. The team repositioned India Post as the cost-saving option with competitive delivery times, specifically in the context of war surcharges. The communication went out to existing customers and reached potential customers through the platform's available channels. The message was simple and direct: while other carriers are now charging extra, India Post is not. And it delivers on time.

This shift, from product communication to benefit communication during a crisis moment, takes real speed to execute. The team had to first notice the surcharge situation, then connect it to India Post's pricing, then build and push the message, all within the first few days of March. The data shows they did it fast enough to capture the March wave.

The TAT data also supported this move. Because the dashboard showed that India Post's delivery times were genuinely competitive, the team could confidently say it was not just cheap but also reliable. That made the message stronger and more believable.

4.7 Key Findings

Table 4.10: Key Findings Summary

Finding	What the Data Shows
Shipments more than doubled	134% growth from Feb to March, from 1,216 to 2,848 shipments
Revenue nearly tripled	143% growth, from Rs. 9.88L to Rs. 24.01L in a single month

Finding	What the Data Shows
USA became the top destination	USA share in ITPS jumped from 3.82% to 24%, directly linked to war surcharges on USA routes
ITPS grew faster than EMS	ITPS up 178%, EMS up 53%. The cheaper service benefited more from the price gap
Weight profile diversified	0-250g share fell from 51% to 38.6%. New customers brought heavier shipments
Geographic spread of nodes widened	Jaipur dropped from 77% to 70% share. Delhi and Surat both grew, showing new customer base from other cities
Market peaked in week 3 of March	Weekly trend shows a 2-3 week lag between the war trigger and peak customer response
Repositioning message was a key driver	Platform's shift from product to benefit communication during the crisis helped speed up customer acquisition

Source: Company Dashboard (Metabase), 2026; Author's Analysis

4.8 Recommendations

4.8.1 For Logistics Platforms

Keep an eye on geopolitical events and their impact on logistics in real time. The window between a disruption happening and the market fully adjusting is short, usually one to two weeks. A platform that finds a competitive advantage during that window and communicates it fast can gain a lot of new business. For this, having a basic monitoring process for surcharge announcements by major carriers is useful.

Do not wait for customers to discover a price advantage on their own. The platform's proactive communication in early March is what drove the speed of the response. A customer who does not know India Post has no surcharge will not switch to it on their own. The message needs to go out fast and through the channels customers actually use, like WhatsApp, email, and platform notifications.

Invest in keeping dashboard data updated and easy to read. The ability to see that the USA was suddenly the top destination, almost in real time, is what allowed the team

to confirm the shift was happening and keep pushing the message. Good data infrastructure is important for crisis response.

Focus on retaining the new customers who joined in March. Many came in as trial customers because of the surcharge situation. Once surcharges reduce, some will go back to their old carriers. The ones who had a good experience with India Post in March are the ones who will stay. A follow-up process for new customers should be part of the strategy.

Update India Post's positioning permanently, not just during crises. The pricing advantage and TAT performance are there all the time, not just when there is a war. If the platform communicates these clearly and consistently, it does not need a crisis to drive interest.

4.8.2 For SME Exporters

Do not make logistics decisions based on reputation alone. India Post has a perception problem, but the actual performance data shows it is competitive for standard B2C export destinations. Exporters who have avoided it because they thought it was slow are likely leaving money on the table.

Always compare total shipping cost including all surcharges, not just base rates. During a geopolitical crisis, the gap between India Post and private carriers can widen a lot in India Post's favour. Having India Post already set up as an option before a crisis hits means you can switch quickly rather than spending time setting up the service in the middle of a disruption.

Spread logistics choices across more than one carrier or carrier type. Depending only on private carriers makes a business vulnerable to any disruption affecting those carriers. Adding India Post as a regular option gives exporters a fallback that is often cheaper and is protected from market risk pricing.

For exporters shipping regularly to the USA, which the data shows is a large and growing market for Indian B2C exports, India Post's ITPS is worth using as a primary option, not just a backup.

4.8.3 For Future Research

A study tracking whether March 2026 customers continued using India Post through April, May, and June would tell us if the growth was sustained or just a one-time crisis-driven spike. This distinction matters a lot for platform strategy.

A study comparing India Post volumes across multiple platforms during the same period would help understand whether the growth seen here was platform-specific or a broader market trend. If every platform saw similar growth, the story is about the market. If only this platform saw it, the story is about the communication strategy.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Findings

This study started with a simple observation: something in the India Post B2C export data changed sharply between February and March 2026. The analysis confirmed what changed, by how much, and why.

In January 2026, the India Post service was just starting on the platform, with 15-20 customers and revenue below one lakh rupees. February showed strong, steady growth: 132 customers, 1,216 shipments, Rs. 9.88 lakh in revenue. Canada, Germany, and France were the top destinations. The USA was barely present.

Then the Iran war started on February 28, 2026. Private logistics companies applied war risk surcharges from early March. India Post did not. In March, everything changed: 181 customers, 2,848 shipments, Rs. 24 lakh in revenue. The USA jumped from 3.82% of ITPS revenue to 24%. ITPS grew by 178%. The geographic spread of customers widened. The weight profile shifted. The market had responded.

The platform did not sit back and let this happen on its own. It changed its communication message, repositioning India Post from a partner option to a cost-saving, reliable choice, and pushed this to customers through available channels. The combination of a real market advantage and a well-timed message is what drove the scale of the March growth.

The TAT data supported this story. India Post was not just cheaper, it was also delivering well. Average and P80 delivery times were competitive across most destinations. This gave the platform confidence to position India Post on quality, not just price.

5.2 Implications

5.2.1 For Logistics Platforms

The clearest lesson is that platforms need to be quick and ready during geopolitical disruptions. The window to capture market share is short, usually two to three weeks from when the disruption starts. A platform that identifies the advantage quickly, frames it correctly, and communicates it to the right customers can gain in a short time what might otherwise take months of regular sales work.

The March data also shows that the gains were real and not just surface level. New customers came in, existing customers shipped more, and the geographic and weight profile of the business diversified. This is healthy growth. The underlying reason India Post was attractive, government pricing not linked to market surcharges, does not go away when the war ends.

5.2.2 For SME Exporters

For individual exporters, the data makes a clear case for adding India Post to the logistics mix. The price advantage is real. The delivery times are competitive. And during crises, which are becoming more common in global trade, India Post offers a stable option that private carriers cannot match on price.

The growth on the USA route during March 2026 is especially useful for exporters targeting that market. Indian goods have strong demand in the US, in jewellery, apparel, and accessories. Shipping cost has always been a barrier. India Post reduces that barrier by a meaningful amount.

5.2.3 For Academics and Researchers

This study adds a specific, data-backed case study to the area of geopolitical risk in supply chains, focusing on the B2C postal logistics segment in India, which has not been studied much. It also shows how a logistics platform can serve as a natural experiment: when one option like India Post is protected from market pricing

pressure and others are not, the customer response gives a clean and clear signal about price sensitivity in the B2C export segment.

5.2.4 For Policymakers

India Post's decision to not apply war surcharges had direct and positive results for Indian SME exporters. This is worth noting from a policy point of view. Government logistics services that maintain stable pricing during global crises give real support to small businesses, even if that support is not explicitly designed as a policy action. Maintaining and strengthening these services is good for the export economy.

5.3 Limitations

The study is based on data from one platform only. India Post processes shipments through many partners and channels, and the growth seen here may not show the full picture of India Post's B2C export growth in this period.

The reason individual customers chose India Post in March is inferred from market context. There was no direct survey or customer interview to confirm that war surcharges were the specific reason for switching. The link is strong and the timing is clear, but it is inference, not direct proof.

January data is approximate because the service was newly launched and dashboard records were less complete.

The study only covers three months. Longer-term tracking would give a more complete picture of whether the March gains were sustained or temporary.

5.4 Scope for Future Research

The most useful direction for future research is tracking whether the new customers who joined in March continued shipping through India Post in the months after. If

they did, it confirms that crisis-driven customer acquisition can turn into long-term relationships. If they did not, it raises questions about what makes India Post sticky or not.

A comparison across platforms during the same period, looking at India Post volumes on multiple logistics aggregators at the same time, would tell whether the growth was driven by this platform's specific strategy or was a broader market trend. This would help separate the contribution of the repositioning message from the overall market shift.

A gender and size analysis of the exporter base could also be worth doing. Many Indian B2C exporters are women-led micro-businesses. Understanding whether this group shifted towards India Post in the same pattern as larger exporters would help in planning future outreach.

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